s°6    FRANCE 
^^  vIDTHEWAR 

J.  MARK  BALDWIN 


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FRANCE 
AND  THE  WAR 

AS   SEEN   BY   AN   AMERICAN 


BY 

JAMES  MARK  BALDWIN 


D.    APPLETON    AND    COMPANY 
NEW    YORK  1916 


COPTBIGHT,   1916,   BT 

D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY 


Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America 


PREFATORY  NOTE 

Having  lived  in  France  the  better  part  of  each  of 
the  last  six  years,  I  have  had  unusual  opportunities  of 
observation  by  reason  of  the  great  hospitality  shown 
me  in  scientific  and  literary  circles.  It  is  only  fair  to 
add,  also,  that  my  previous  and  more  remote  prejudg- 
ments were,  in  many  respects,  favorable  to  Germany, 
because  of  my  sojourn  in  Berlin  and  Leipzig  as  a  student, 

J.  M.  B. 


340153 


France,  brave  foster-sister,  hail! 
Thy  comrade  since  our  double  birth, 
Thy  twin  Republic  greets  thee,  hail! 
Once   more   to   prove   thy   boasted   power 
To  make  the  distant  vision  real, 
Wed  deed  to  thought!     Reveal  again 
Thy  soul  intrepid,  kin  to  ours — 
Defender  of  the  rights  of  man! 

(From  the  author's  lines  "The  Voice  of  America- 
August  1915,"  printed  in  part  in  The  Times.) 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

The  position  of  England  in  the  war  has 
been  much  discussed,  although  to  the  un- 
biassed onlooker  it  seems  plain  enough,  no 
doubt  because  the  matter  has  been  clouded 
by  reason  of  certain  charges  brought 
against  England  by  Germany.  England 
has  become  Germany's  ^^ dearest  foe"  in 
this  war.  As  a  result  the  place  of  France 
and  the  reasons  for  French  participation 
in  the  war  have  remained  under  certain 
obscurities  which,  in  justice  to  the  French, 
should  be  cleared  up. 

It  is  remarkable,  at  the  outset,  that  the 
Germans  do  not  bring  any  charges  against 
France,  save  the  vague  one— put  forth 
officially  late  in  the  game— that  France 
had  intended  to  violate  the  neutrality  of 

5 


'*"''  *  FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

Belgium.  They  confess,  on  the  contrary, 
that  it  was  their  own  intention  to  crush 
France  utterly  in  any  case.  On  this  show- 
ing, they  admit  that  France  was  fully 
justified  in  resisting;  and  they  admire  the 
heroism  with  which  she  resisted.  There  is 
a  good  deal  more  in  the  subject  of  the 
place  of  France  in  the  present  war  than 
this,  however ;  and  certain  of  the  current 
presuppositions  on  the  subject— current  in 
the  United  States  at  least— are  ill- 
founded.  I  wish  to  show  this  in  what 
follows. 


My  principal  object  is  to  show  that 
modern  France,  the  France  of  the  Third 
Republic,  is  not  a  military  or  martial 
country  in  either  of  the  two  distinct 
senses,  moral  and  political,  of  the  term 
^  *  militarism. "  It  is  said,  by  apologists  for 
Germany,  that  France  has  a  standing 
army  larger  in  proportion  to  her  popula- 
tion than  Germany,  and  that  the  term  of 
compulsory  service  is  longer  than  in  the 
former  country.  These  facts  present  the 
outward  signs  of  militarism,  superficially 
understood.  But  they  do  not  indicate 
either  a  military  attitude  toward  life,  a 
psychological  and  moral  militarism,  so  to 
designate  it,  or  an  official  military  attitude 
toward  other  countries,  a  political  militar- 
ism.   They  are  to  be  explained  as  issuing 

9 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

from  two  general  causes  and  as  reflecting 
two  great  facts  in  the  life  of  Republican 
France— facts,  one  of  wliicli  the  French 
have  accepted  until  recently  with  resigna- 
tion, and  the  other  of  which  they  are  only 
now  appreciating  at  its  full  worth.  Both 
have  become  so  prominent  and  everpres- 
ent  to  the  minds  of  the  people  that 
they  are  fixed  in  special  phrases:  the 
^^ German  menace"  and  the  ^^ triple  en- 
tente." In  French  opinion,  from  coach- 
man to  minister,  from  Royalist  to  Radical 
Socialist,  the  G  erman  menace  has  become, 
since  the  Tangier  incident  of  1905,  a  sort 
of  datum  of  the  emotional  life,  an  assump- 
tion that  needs  no  argument,  an  ever- 
present  fact,  like  the  danger  of  a  cholera 
epidemic  or  the  menace  of  a  flood  in  the 
Seine.  And  the  triple  entente,  the  alli- 
ance with  Russia,  taken  together  with  the 
understanding  with  England,  has  been 
considered,  in  all  educated  and  well-in- 

10 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

formed  circles,  the  available  political 
weapon,  the  tool  of  diplomacy,  the  pledge 
of  the  preservation  not  only  of  the  lib- 
erties of  France,  but  of  those  of  all 
Europe.  It  has  insured  the  superior 
power  by  which  alone  military  aggression 
could  be  met.  Before  1905,  the  date  of 
the  Tangier  incident,  neither  of  these 
facts  had  its  true  value  in  popular  opinion. 
Although  the  German  menace  existed,  it 
was  not  perceived  in  all  its  meaning  save 
by  certain  prudent  statesmen,  like  Del- 
casse,  who  were  not,  as  so  many  of  the 
politicians  were,  chasing  the  rainbows  of 
international  socialism. 

I  wish  to  enlarge  a  little  on  these  two 
things,  especially  the  former,  as  explain- 
ing the  moral  and  psychological  tolerance 
extended  in  recent  years  to  the  military 
establislmient,  and  justifying  the  political 
policies  by  which  the  ''triple  entente" 
was  maintained  and  extended. 

11 


n 


II 


The  German  menace  dates,  of  course,  in 
its  present  form— speaking  as  if  before 
the  present  war  broke  out— from  the  war 
of  1870,  after  which  France  found  herself 
in  a  position  of  humiliation.  She  had 
good  reason  to  see,  in  the  terms  of  the 
treaty  of  Frankfort  a  threat  of  repeated 
aggression  and  possible  extinction.  Dur- 
ing the  early  years  of  the  Republic,  how- 
ever, the  theories  of  the  Jacobins  were 
so  ^^ violently  pacific,"  and  were  to  such 
an  extent  based  on  international  toler- 
ance and  brotherhood,  that  the  French 
lost  their  fear  of  German  aggression  and 
also  much  of  their  own  proper  patriotic 
feeling.  The  sense  of  security  based  on 
internationalism  was  aggravated  by  the 

15 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

success  of  the  socialistic  party  in  1902, 
and  by  the  subsequent  radical  develop- 
ment of  theoretical  democracy  during  the 
administration  of  Combes. 

But  the  fear  and  the  patriotic  feeling 
were  both  revived  by  a  series  of  unpro- 
voked diplomatic  and  military  provoca- 
tions which  seemed  to  the  French  to  be 
due,  on  the  one  hand,  to  the  German  ap- 
preciation of  the  national  insouciance, 
and  on  the  other  hand,  to  German  jeal- 
ousy of  the  cultural  successes  of  France. 

During  a  series  of  years,  the  French 
met  this  policy  of  pinpricks  with  a  mod- 
eration, sang-froid,  and  dignity  to  which 
all  the  world  testified  on  the  occasion  of 
the  Agadir  incident  and  during  the  entire 
Morocco  embroglio ;  the  more  striking  in 
that  this  incident  followed  the  Tangier 
affair  and  other  events  all  calculated  to 
excite  suspicion  and  arouse  resentment. 
Anyone  who  cares  to  look  up  the  files  of 

16 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

the  Temps,  the  Debats,  the  Figaro,  during 
those  anxious  days  of  1911,  when  the 
issues  of  war  and  peace  were  in  the  bal- 
ance, will  find  evidence  of  this.  Calm, 
resolute,  as  in  the  similar  days  of  last 
July,  the  French  press  pointed  out  rea- 
sons for  the  aggression,  finding  in  it  only 
that  specter,  the  menace  Allemande  in  a 
new  form.  There  was  no  public  excite- 
ment, none  of  the  hysterical  display  that 
superficial  British  and  American  opinion 
sometimes  associates  with  the  French. 
Admiration  of  this  fine  moderation  was 
publicly  expressed  at  certain  American 
functions  held  at  Paris  at  the  time.  The 
French  attitude  was  recognized  as  show- 
ing a  certain  stoical  resolution,  based  on 
the  anticipation,  not  then  to  be  fully  real- 
ized as  it  is  so  horribly  now,  of  the  inevi- 
table war.  Of  the  coming  war  there  has 
been  no  doubt  at  all  since  the  fall  of  Del- 
casse  in  1905,  a  sacrifice  to  Germany.  But 
17 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

in  1911  there  was  a  sense  of  adequate 
preparation,  as  there  had  not  been  in 
1905,  a  sense  of  the  mastery  of  the  vital 
and  material  resources  of  war,  which  so 
nobly  appears  today  in  all  the  French 
people. 

Soon  after  came  the  Saverne  affair, 
followed  by  a  remarkable  series  of  pin- 
pricks to  French  susceptibilities  as  rep- 
resented by  their  sympathy  for  the  un- 
fortunate people  of  Alsace.  In  certain 
villages,  the  populace  had  ventured  to 
smile  at  the  arrogance  of  the  Prussian 
military  authorities  and  some  had  even 
joked  at  the  expense  of  the  strutting  Ger- 
man soldier.  In  the  contest  that  ensued 
between  the  civil  and  military  authorities, 
the  latter  were  of  course  victorious :  mili- 
tary personages  found  guilty  by  the  civil 
courts  of  outrages  against  the  populace 
were  freed  by  Berlin  from  all  penal  re- 
sponsibility; and  innocent  citizens,  sus- 

18 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

pected  of  French  sympathies,  were 
crushed  by  the  imposing  authority  of  the 
mailed  fist.  An  officer  found  guilty  of 
slashing  a  cripple  with  his  saber  was  given 
military  justification  under  cover  of  'a 
nominal  reproof.  These  petty  tyrannies 
were  accomplished  by  subterfuges  w^hich 
show  that  the  methods  now  employed  in 
Belgium  are  no  new  discovery.  Had  not 
the  cripple  showed  himself  guilty  by  try- 
ing to  run  away?  Finally,  the  famous 
cartoonist  and  literary  man,  Hansi,  who 
ventured  to  portray  the  grotesque  side  of 
militarism  in  daily  life,  had  to  flee  co- 
vertly from  the  country  into  France  to 
escape  a  sentence  of  imprisonment. 

All  this  pettiness  was  met  by  the  French 
with  good  hinnor,  but  humor  tinged  with 
the  melancholy  of  a  deep-seated  presenti- 
ment. The  subtle  irony  seen  in  French 
publications  of  the  year  1911-1912,  had 
a  touch  of  bitterness  and  withal  of  dis- 
19 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

gust.  What  does  it  show?  was  the  ques- 
tion asked  in  those  days.  The  reply  was 
not  Prussian  conceit,  coarseness,  bragga- 
docio only,  but  an  underlying  anti- 
French  policy,  a  smouldering  jealousy,  an 
unsatiated  appetite.  French  opinion, 
aroused  before,  was  now  shocked;  its 
native  chivalry  was  outraged.  And  more 
than  this,  its  conviction  of  German  ani- 
mosity was  confirmed.  Are  such  things, 
they  asked,  as  free  speech,  public  criti- 
cism of  officials,  the  rights  of  the  press, 
suppressed  in  Alsace  1  Do  the  Germans 
themselves  accept  elsewhere  such  viola- 
tions of  the  elementary  rights  of  free  citi- 
zenship? They  were  justified  in  think- 
ing that  even  the  Teutonic  thoroughness 
was  stretching  itself  a  little  in  thus  pre- 
senting to  the  gaze  of  the  sensitive 
people  across  the  border  such  a  spectacle 
of  the  lost  territory. 
But  the  more  essential  fact  was  that 
20 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

the  French  were  unable  to  put  themselves 
in  the  shoes  of  the  Germans,  to  think  as 
the  Germans  thought.  Their  mentality 
was  different,  and  the  training  they  had 
received.  Since  the  day  of  Gambetta, 
the  French  had  been  losing  respect  for 
the  military  point  of  view  which  makes 
the  soldier  the  center  of  things  temporal 
and  eternal.  They  were  busy  working  out 
their  theories  of  democracy  and  the  rights 
of  man.  They  shrugged  their  shoulders 
in  private  at  the  German  coclions,  the 
people  who  dressed  untidily,  left  their 
hands  uncared  for,  trod  on  one's  toes  in 
summer  hotels,  talked  constantly  of  their 
nazionales  Beivtisstsein,  and  displayed  a 
sort  of  egoistic  religious  sentiment  which 
flattered  their  national  vanity  (I  speak  as 
the  Frenchman  would).  But  they  now 
found  in  this  same  Germanism  something 
to  be  watched,  something  allied  openly 
with  force,  something  that  authorized  its 
21 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

apostles  to  preach  conquest  and  world- 
dominance.  This  is  what  the  French 
have  found  growing  up  in  their  minds 
these  last  years,  becoming  a  nightmare  as 
every  evening  paper  was  found  to  report 
some  new  sign  of  what  they  now  call 
^^bocherie."  Since  the  war  broke  out,  I 
have  heard  more  than  once  the  sentiment : 
^*  Thank  God,  now  we  know  what  is  to 
be  done."  There  is  no  longer  the  uncer- 
taint}^,  the  hesitation,  the  dread;  these 
have  been  replaced  by  the  task,  the  duty. 
What  right,  does  one  ask,  had  France 
to  prepare  to  meet  such  menace  as  this? 
The  right  of  any  nation  to  live,  to  cherish 
its  national  aspirations,  to  pursue  its 
mission  in  peace.  France  found  herself 
in  living  in  a  fooPs  paradise,  indulging 
in  the  socialistic  dream  of  universal  fra- 
ternity. There  had  even  been  a  Germano- 
phile  movement— or  at  least  a  movement 
of  imitation— in  science,  education,  and 

22 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

letters,  similar  to  that  from  wliicli  the 
United  States  has  been  recently  recover- 
ing. But  when  the  ominous  clouds  ap- 
peared, French  patriotism  was  reborn  in 
a  day. 

That  this  represents  truthfully  the  state 
of  the  French  mind  at  the  outbreak  of 
the  present  war,  there  are  abundant  ex- 
ternal signs  to  show:  for  example,  the 
character  of  recent  French  governments. 
France  has  had  a  socialistic  government 
for  years.  The  dominant  coalition  of 
parties  has  been  professedly  antimilitary. 
Every  increase  in  the  budget  for  army  or 
navy— increases  which  have  been  con- 
tinuous since  the  Tangier  incident— has 
had  long  and  passionate  discussion  and 
has  required  overwhelming  justification 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  national 
defense.  Cabinet  after  cabinet  has  felt 
the  drift  toward  disarmament,  being 
obliged  to  pacify  the  pacificists,  so  to 
23 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

speak,  in  respect  to  the  most  moderate 
measures  of  military  prudence.  The  Rad- 
ical Socialists,  led  by  Jean  Jaures,  out- 
spoken and  persistent  both  in  the  Cham- 
ber and  in  their  organs,  VHumanite  and 
La  Guerre  sociale^  have  continued  the  tra- 
dition of  Combism.  Fortunately,  the  ris- 
ing tide  of  nationalism  has  been  more 
than  a  sufficient  antidote. 

The  significance  of  all  this  is  shown 
in  the  last  great  struggle  of  the  kind,  that 
which  took  place  over  the  new  law  re- 
quiring three  years  of  compulsory  mili- 
tary service— the  loi  de  trois  ans}  The 
passage  of  this  law,  while  not  technically 
the  cause  of  the  fall  of  the  Barthou  cabi- 
net, was  practically  so,  by  reason  of  the 

1  The  history  of  the  laws  regulating  the  term  of  ser- 
vice is  itself  significant.  The  term  had  been  reduced 
by  successive  steps  until  it  stood  at  two  years.  The 
return  to  military  prudence  and  preparation  was  then 
reflected  in  this  new  law  restoring  the  period  of  three 
years. 

24 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

sharpening  and  solidifying  of  the  oppo- 
sition which  it  brought  about.  Never  in 
recent  years— never  since  the  Dreyfus 
affair,  let  us  say — has  the  Republic  had 
a  time  of  greater  storm  and  stress  than 
during  the  period  of  the  discussion  of  this 
measure.  Never  was  the  policy  of  mili- 
tarism as  such  more  plainly  and  vigor- 
ously condemned;  never  were  those  of 
national  defense  and  racial  integrity  more 
earnestly  and  forcefully  advocated. 
Never  was  the  German  menace  more  elo- 
quently, and  withal  more  convincingly, 
presented  to  the  people  of  France.  The 
measure  was  passed  in  a  great  outburst 
of  popular  feeling.  The  government  had 
staked  its  existence  upon  its  passage, 
declaring  it  to  be  essential  to  the  national 
safety.  Here  was  the  German  menace 
taking  on  concrete  numerical  form;  and 
it  was  such  men  as  Barthou,  Leon  Bour- 
geois, Alexandre  Ribot,  Poincare— econ- 

25 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

omists,  scholars,  statesmen  of  diverse 
political  creeds— who  formulated  the  na- 
tional sentiment,  supported  by  a  public 
press  which  was  conducted  with  unusual 
ability  and  high  patriotism.  How  the 
wisdom  of  these  men  was  justified  by  the 
event ! 

In  the  subsequent  cabinets,  dominated 
by  extreme  radicals,  the  law  of  three  years 
has  remained  on  the  statute  books.  Its 
former  enemies,  although  in  power,  have 
not  dared  to  repeal  it  in  the  face  of  the 
national  sentiment.  Its  wisdom  was 
finally  acknowledged  by  Doumerge  and 
his  fellow-ministers,  Caillaux  et  ah^ 
whether  from  patriotism  or  from  party 
policy  one  may  entertain  a  doubt.  It  had 
come  into  effective  operation  when  the 
war-cloud  burst ;  and  its  immediate  effect 
was  a  considerable  increase  in  the 
army,  through  the  retention  of  the 
class  of  men  who  would  otherwise 
26 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

have  been  released  in  1914.  Since 
the  war  began,  socialists  of  the  most 
radical  type  have  declared  their  sat- 
isfaction that  the  law  became  effective  in 
time.  No  doubt  the  martyred  Jaures 
would  have  joined  in  this  view  had  he 
lived  to  see  the  course  of  events.  In  the 
present  war  cabinet,  formed  from  all  the 
political  parties  for  the  national  defense, 
two  portfolios  are  held  by  well-known 
militant  socialists— Guesde  and  Sembat. 
In  no  party,  moreover,  is  there  any  sign 
of  disaffection  in  respect  to  the  conduct 
of  the  war.^ 


^  The  opinions  of  Guesde  and  Sembat  on  the  war  and 
the  future  of  socialism  are  to  be  found  in  the  news- 
papers of  February  11  (see  the  Figaro  of  that  date) ; 
they  both  gave  out  interviews  outlining:  their  attitude 
in  respect  to  the  proposed  conference  of  socialists  of 
the  allied  nations,  held  in  London  during  the  week  of 
February  14.  It  is  to  be  regi-etted  that  the  same 
united  front  has  not  been  presented  by  the  English 
socialists,  as  may  be  gathered  from  the  remonstrances 
addressed  to  Mr.  Kier  Hardie  and  his  associates  of  the 

27 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

So  far  then  from  indicating  a  military 
state  of  mind  in  the  nation  at  large,  the 
will  to  be  a  great  military  power,  the 
renewed  warlike  preparations  of  France 
in  the  last  decade  represent  something 
very  different— a  growing  apprehension, 
and  with  it  a  reaction  against  the  loose 
unnational  liberalism  of  the  democratic 
doctrinaires.     Such  military  precautions 
may  have  increased  the  danger  of  war; 
the  increase  of  armaments  usually  does 
have  such  an  effect.    This  was  one  of  the 
arguments  of  Jaures  and  others  against 
the  law  of  three   years.     The   German 
Chancellor,  in  fact,  made  use  of  the  pas- 
sage of  this  law  to  support  his  demand 
for   new   military   credits   in   Germany. 
But  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that 
this  and  the  other  military  measures  taken 

Independent  Labor  Party  by  Mr.  Hyndman  and  by  the 
Belgian  leader,  Vandervelder  (see  recent  issues  of 
Humanite). 

28 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

in  France  were  in  themselves  motived  by 
considerations  of  national  defense;  it  is 
certain,  at  any  rate,  they  were  received 
by  the  people  in  this  sense. 

Another  motive  of  aggression  attrib- 
uted to  the  French  is  that  of  revenge— 
revenge  for  the  loss  of  Alsace-Lorraine. 
Such  a  passion  of  revenge  is  constantly 
charged  to  them  by  what  the  French 
characterize  as  the  clumsy  indulgence  of 
patronizing  enemies.  The  Germans  find 
in  this  feeling  the  sufficient  reason  of  all 
the  French  military  measures.  It  is  so 
generally  taken  for  granted,  indeed,  as 
being  a  natural  feeling,  that  the  entire 
absence  of  it  before  the  present  war,  a 
fact  to  which  I  can  testify,  is  more  than 
noteworthy.  Never  have  I  heard  such  a 
feeling  expressed  in  any  French  circle; 
nor  have  I  heard  the  topic  of  revenge 
discussed  except  in  historical  connections. 
The  revanche  of  the  Gambettists,  and  that 
29 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

of  the  special  prophets  of  Alsace  like 
Deroulede,  were  discussed  with  the  or- 
dinary French  love  of  analysis  and  para- 
dox, but  not  as  being  a  living  national 
purpose  or  motive.  The  feeling  was 
really  one  of  humane  pity  for  the  in- 
habitants of  the  lost  provinces  and  the 
wish  that  at  some  future  time  they  might 
be  delivered.  It  was  pro-Alsatian  more 
than  anti-German.  So  radically  unmili- 
tary  have  their  ideals  become  under  the 
Republican  regime,  that  the  French 
cannot  conceive  of  happiness  or  content- 
ment in  unfortunate  Alsace,  under  the 
Prussian  rule.  Of  course  now,  since  the 
outbreak  of  war,  the  people  talk  of  re- 
venge and  the  literary  men  of  retribu- 
tion;^ it  is  part  of  the  new  war  spirit. 

^  Shortly  after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  copies  of 
the  treaty  of  Frankfort  were  sold  on  the  boulevards; 
and  a  play,  entitled  "I'Aube  de  la  Revanche,"  is  now 
(February)  being  produced  in  one  of  the  Paris  thea- 
ters. 

30 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

But  to  speak  of  the  French  nation  as 
having  prepared  its  army  and  built  its 
navy  in  order  to  wreak  vengeance  on  Ger- 
many is  nothing  short  of  grotesque.  The 
motive  of  revenge  in  such  a  form  would 
conflict  with  the  profoundest  elements  of 
the  culture  of  modern  France. 

A  quite  different  sentiment,  entertained 
by  the  French  people  generally,  is  every- 
where in  evidence— that  which  is  di- 
rected against  the  religious  chauvinism 
found  associated  with  German  militarism. 
This  is  to  them  a  form  of  pretense,  of 
religiosity,  accompanied  by  a  ridiculous 
inflation  of  personality.  The  Kaiser's 
frequent  appeals  to  the  Deity  on  terms 
of  equality,  and  with  the  suggestion  of 
a    secret    entente^  between  himself  and 


^  An   entente,    however,    which,   through   no   fault   of 

the  Kaiser's,  does  not  always  produce  the  results  desired. 

His   Majesty   is   reported   to   have   said   to   his   troops 

{Vossische  Zeitung,  as  quoted  in  the  Figaro,  February 

31 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

God,  illustrate  so  well  what  is  meant  that 
the  reader  will  have  no  difficulty  in  recog- 
nizing it.  French  writers  find  in  this 
religiosity  one  of  the  prime  factors  of 
racial  exclusiveness ;  to  the  onlooker  it 
offers  a  real  problem  in  the  psychology 
of  the  military  State.  Looked  at  from 
the  point  of  view  of  French  liberalism, 
it  proves  the  Germans  to  be  at  a  tribal 
stage  of  political  development  and  re- 
ligious culture  alike.  Respectful  to  re- 
ligion always— reverential  now,  as  I  am 
to  show  lower  down— the  unpolitical 
everyday  Frenchman  has  no  patience 
with  the  form  of  religion  in  which  the 
Deity  identifies  his  interest  exclusively 
with  those  of  a  self-elected  tribe  or  race, 
and  issues  to  a  ^^ chosen  people"  a  man- 


17)  :  ''I  hope  with  all  my  heart  we  shall  be  able  to 
celebrate  the  sacred  festival  of  Easter  in  peace  and  joy 
at  our  homes.  I  call  upon  God  to  witness  that  if  this 
is  not  the  case,  it  will  not  be  my  fault." 

32 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

date  to  conquer  and  destroy.  In  Ger- 
many, as  all  who  have  lived  there  know, 
this  is  not  an  accidental,  local,  or  super- 
ficial thing.  Taught  in  the  schools  and 
universities  by  means  of  state-edited  text- 
books, enforced  by  church,  press,  and 
public  opinion,  equally  under  state  super- 
vision, it  has  been  wrought  into  the 
national  tissue.  It  is  the  justification, 
in  theory  and  practice,  not  only  of  the 
Germany  that  now  is,  but  of  that  which 
is  to  come— DeutscJdand  uber  Alles.  The 
^^ national  destiny,"  gained  by  alliance 
with  the  Almighty,  is  the  end  that 
justifies  the  means.  The  Chancellor 
so  declared  in  reference  to  the  viola- 
tion of  the  territory  of  Belgium.  With 
this  end  goes  the  most  varied  means: 
the  sword,  the  torch,  the  bomb,  the  mine, 
the  diplomatic  subterfuge.  It  restores  the 
commission  of  Gideon  who  slew  the  ene- 
mies of  Jehovah,  and  that  of  Elijah  who 
33 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

destroyed  the  prophets  and  also  the  ^*high 
places''— the  cathedrals,  such  as  they 
were— of  Baal. 

In  contrast  with  this,  the  cosmopolitan- 
ism of  French  culture  shows  itself  pos- 
sessed of  all  the  benign  and  pacific  marks 
of  true  toleration.  Call  it  free  thought, 
if  you  will,  call  it  enlightenment,  attribute 
it  to  rationalism  or  to  positivism  or  to 
socialism,  its  character  remains  the  same. 
It  shudders  with  horror  at  the  invocation 
of  a  Deity  who  spreads  His  glory  by  the 
shedding  of  blood ;  and  it  cannot  restrain 
the  shrug  of  contempt  for  the  devotee 
who  makes  himself  the  chosen  instrument 
of  such  a  Deity.  Professor  Boutroux 
has  declared  that  a  certain  brutality  is 
inherent  in  the  nature  of  German  na- 
tional culture;  we  see  here,  perhaps,  the 
reason  for  it.  It  finds  its  prototype  in 
the  relentlessness  of  the  destroying 
angel  of  tradition— now  taking  form  in 

34 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

the  Uhlan,  equipped  in  German  casque 
and  mail.  No  doubt  there  are  many  men 
inspired  with  the  zeal  of  crusaders  among 
the  hosts  that  have  invaded  Belgium  and 
France.  I  think  the  French  feel  that  the 
great  body  of  the  German  middle-class 
people  look  upon  themselves  and  their 
nation  as  true  crusaders,  following  a  di- 
vinely commissioned  Gideon;  but  they 
believe  that  these  are  directed  in  their 
mission  by  religious  egoists  and  conscious 
hypocrites,^  and  the  very  severity  of  their 


^  This  impression  of  hypocrisy  is  just  now  brought 
out  in  the  comments  upon  the  German  war  circular, 
"Appeal  to  the  Christians  of  Protestant  Churches  of  the 
French  Language,"  addressed  to  "Foreign  Protestants 
in  Neutral  and  Hostile  Countries,"  in  which  Germany 
makes  herself  champion  of  Protestant  Christianity  and 
Christian  Missions  as  against  England!  One  is  con- 
strained to  ask:  How  about  Catholic  Austria,  and 
Mohammedan  Turkey?  Signers  of  this  manifesto, 
among  them  Eucken,  Harnack,  and  Wundt,  must  know 
that  similar  appeals  issued  in  the  Orient  describe  the 
Kaiser  as  "His  Islamic  Majesty"  who  is  to  impose  upon 

35 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

judgment  of  the  military  class  and  of  its 
resort  to  religious  cant,  shows  how  far 
removed  the  French  point  of  view  is  from 
that  of  such  a  militarism. 

As  to  cosmopolitanism,  the  French  value 
it  as  being  the  priceless  pacific  agency 
of  life,  the  destroyer  of  racial  preju- 
dice, the  begetter  of  sympathetic  relation- 
ships among  men.  But  they  are  coming 
to  recognize  that  in  the  theory  of  in- 
ternationalism there  are  the  germs 
of  national  weakness,  since  in  prac- 
tice it  destroys  true  patriotic  feeling 
and  produces  symptoms  of  political 
palsy. 

To  one  who  has  lived  in  both  countries, 
Germany  and  France,  the  contrast  be- 
tween them  is  striking  in  the  extreme; 
and  both  differ  from  the  complacent  but 

Europe  the  Mohammedan  faith  now  espoused  by  him. 
The  similar  cultivation  of  the  favor  of  the  Vatican  is 
left  to  Austria. 

36 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

tolerant  provincialism  of  the  English.  Not 
only  in  popular  sentiment  does  the  differ- 
ence appear,  but  in  the  avowed  purposes 
and  policies  of  institutions  and  social  or- 
ganizations of  all  sorts.  The  Germans 
declaim  against  the  use  of  French  fash- 
ions; deplore  the  introduction  of  French 
words  even  on  menu-cards ;  read  lectures, 
in  the  press  and  by  resolution  of  Ger- 
manic societies,  to  the  Germans  in 
America  who  give  their  sons  and 
daughters  un-German  names;  boycott 
music  not  made  in  Germany.  I  was  once 
publicly  reproved  on  a  German  liner, 
when  at  the  captain's  dinner  given 
before  landing,  as  the  different  national 
flags  were  taken  in  turn  out  of  the  cake 
in  the  center  of  the  table  by  admiring 
citizens,  I  rose,  in  the  absence  of  any 
English  passenger,  and  waved  the  Union 
Jack  along  with  the  Stars  and  Stripes. 
*' There,"  said  the  officer  in  charge  of  the 
37 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

table,  ^4s  a  man  who  does  not  love  Gev- 
msinj—der  Deutschland  nicht  lieht/^ 
Not  that  sort  of  Germany,  certainly !  In 
what  other  country  would  an  order  be 
possible  forbidding  all  diplomatic  agents 
of  the  government,  in  time  of  peace,  to 
marry  foreign  wives  ? 

In  Paris  there  is  none  of  this,  little 
of  it  anywhere  in  France.  In  fact  up  to 
a  recent  date,  true  national  sentiment  has 
exposed  itself  to  the  risk  of  being  called 
narrow  and  provincial.  Eecently  the 
French  waiters  in  Paris  have  complained 
of  the  overwhelming  and  unrestricted  in- 
vasion of  their  trade  by  Germans,  but 
without  result.  The  complaint  of  the 
Parisian  opera  dancers,  in  view  of  the 
declining  favor  in  which  they  were  held 
beside  the  Russian  and  other  foreign 
dancers,  met  only  the  reply  that  they  must 
improve  their  performance  and  maintain 
the  French  superiority.     Last  year,  to- 

38 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

ward  the  close  of  the  musical  year,  a 
prominent  daily  paper  said,  in  a  spirit 
of  banter;  ^^Now  that  we  have  had  a 
^Eussian  season,'  and  a  ^Viennese  season,' 
and  ^Italian  and  American  seasons,'  there 
is  nothing  in  the  way  of  our  hearing 
something  French!"  What  Paris  dress- 
maker would  talk  of  excluding  German 
or  American  models,  and  what  French 
artist  would  wish  to  forbid  the  importa- 
tion of  German  or  Italian  paintings  or 
sculptures  ?  The  sort  of  national  feeling 
that  refuses  hospitality  to  the  best  things, 
that  fears  competition  with  alien  methods 
and  ideas,  that  sets  more  store  by  the 
accidents  of  place  and  birth  than  by  what 
is  essential  to  the  universal  ideals  of  art 
and  of  humanity— this  is  not  French.  If 
anyone  doubt  this,  he  may  question  any 
typical  Frenchman  of  education  as  to  liis 
feelings  on  hearing  of  the  destruction  of 
architectural  monuments  at  Louvain  and 
39 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

Eheims;  or,  to  get  a  wider  answer,  con- 
sult the  editorial  opinions  of  the  French 
newspapers  of  the  dates  of  these  occur- 
rences. He  will  find  horror  expressed  and 
protest,  it  is  true ;  but  not  merely  national 
horror,  not  merely  protest  in  the  name  of 
Belgian  or  French  art.  Rather  will  he 
be  impressed  by  the  sentiment  of  uni- 
versal loss,  of  the  outrage  committed  upon 
art  as  such,  of  the  affront  to  human  as- 
piration and  the  insult  to  the  genius  of 
the  past.  ''Mon  Dieu,''  says  he,  ''c'est 
irreparable"— it  cannot  be  replaced! 
While  from  Germany  comes  the  senti- 
ment: '^What  matters  it,  really?  It 
is  a  pity,  but  we  can  make  better 
ones!''^ 


^  I  quote  the  following  from  the  report  made  to  the 
German  government  by  its  expert,  Professor  Paul 
Clemen,  on  the  destruction  of  Rheims  Cathedral  (cited 
by  M.  Damilier,  French  sub-Secretary  of  Fine  Arts) : 
"This  extravagant  worship  of  monuments  is  a  strange 

40 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

None  of  the  methods  characteristic  of 
a  militant  civilization,  as  we  may  call  it, 
is  tolerated  among  the  French.  They 
reject  the  idea  that  real  culture  can  be 
imposed  by  requiring  this  or  that  mode 
of  life  or  standard  of  taste,  an  idea 
which,  in  societies  where  it  is  cur- 
rent, betrays  the  reflection  of  mili- 
tary discipline  into  the  moral  life. 
How  can  free  art,  free  science,  free 
speech,  live  in  an  atmosphere  in  which 
the  spontaneous  activities  of  the  indi- 
vidual, his  impulses  to  live  his  life  and 
express  his  opinions  in  the  light  of  his 
conscience,  are  checked  at  every  turn? 
In  France,  the  wonderful  development  of 
the  fine  arts  testifies  to  the  absence  of  that 
mode  of  deference  which  refers  all  things 
to  the  over-lord,  from  the  cut  of  the  mus- 

sentimentality,  and  anachronism  ...  at  a  time  when 
our  existence  and  the  victory  or  decline  of  German 
thought  {Deutschen  Denken)  are  at  stake." 

41 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

tacMos  to  the  genuineness  of  an  antique 
statue.  In  the  Third  Eepublie  the  popular 
heroes  have  not  been  military  men,  but 
literary  men— artists,  dramatists,  the 
laureates  of  the  Academies,  and  the  win- 
ners of  the  prix  de  Rome.  The  appear- 
ance of  new  books  by  Anatole  Prance  and 
Paul  Bourget  have  been  national  events. 
The  production  of  ^^Chantecler"  and  the 
activities  and  death  of  Gaston  Calmette 
touched  the  Paris  of  the  time  as  much 
as  the  successful  sorties  made  by  the 
troops  in  Morocco.  Whatever  this  may 
have  meant— and  for  some  time  it  be- 
trayed possibly  a  spirit  too  careless  of  the 
tilings  of  real  national  import,  due  to  an 
ideology  of  liberalism  rather  than  to  a 
sound  philosophy  of  society — it  showed, 
without  any  doubt,  that  the  military  in- 
terest held  no  dominant  place  in  the  pub- 
lic mind.  Just  this  state  of  things,  indeed^ 
has  led  to   the  underestimation   of  the 

42 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

present  strength,  and  also  of  the  real 
patriotism  of  the  French,  in  the  minds  of 
foreign  critics  who  have  not  read  the  more 
recent  signs  of  the  times. 

Nowadays,  while  war  is  waging,  the 
tristesse,  the  resigned  patience  of  the 
people,  is  touching,  pathetic.  Theatrical 
performances,  save  of  certain  types,  are 
forbidden;  light  music,  gaiety  in  public 
places,  modish  dress,  are  not  counte- 
nanced. Public  sensibility  revolts  at  the 
suggestion  of  lightness,  in  view  of  the 
usurpation  of  the  resources  of  life  by  the 
fatalities  of  war.  There  is  a  moral  elan, 
a  desperate  earnestness,  a  new  hope,  an 
enthusiasm  for  the  cause ;  and  these  give 
the  assurance  of  victory.  But  there  is 
also  the  shock  to  the  feelings  of  a  high- 
minded  people  who  look  forward  to  a 
long  struggle  against  the  tendencies  to 
debasement  and  materialization  of  moral 
values  which  always  follow  war.    ^^Alas, 

43 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

everything  will  have  to  be  repaired,"  says 
a  prominent  writer.  But  over  against 
this  is  the  recognition  of  the  new  pur- 
pose, the  spirit  of  self-mastery,  of  which 
I  speak  again  just  "below.  Remarking 
upon  such  an  unimportant  incident  as  the 
hissing,  at  one  of  the  theaters,  of  an 
actress  who  danced  the  tango,  M.  Alfred 
Capus  says:  ^^ Perhaps  it  will  be  one  of 
the  miracles  of  the  war,  under  the  favor- 
able conditions  of  victory,  to  have  re- 
formed the  public  taste."  I  may  cite  in 
this  connection  two  snatches  of  conversa- 
tion—almost at  random.  Early  in  the 
war  I  asked  an  officer  whether  the  French 
aviators  would  follow  the  German  ex- 
ample of  dropping  bombs  upon  unde- 
fended cities.  '^Impossible,"  said  he, 
''nous  ne  sont  pas  des  brutes!"  I 
remember  well  the  look  on  the  face  of  a 
society  woman  on  hearing  it  said  that  the 
theaters   in  Berlin   were   patronized   as 

44 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

usual:  ''How  can  they,"  she  said;  ''do 
they  not  mourn  for  their  dead?" 

In  another  respect,  France  has  shown 
herself  for  some  years  occupied  with  other 
things  than  armaments  and  military 
projects.  I  refer  to  the  growth  of  a  new 
idealism. 

Last'  winter  a  well-known  English 
writer,  Mr.  J.  E.  C.  Bodley,  published 
an  essay  on  "The  Decay  of  Idealism  in 
France,"^  from  which  he  read  extracts 
before  the  Academy  of  Moral  Sciences. 
His  point  was,  in  effect,  that  the  age  of 
machinery,  the  mechanical  age,  had  suc- 
ceeded the  age  of  idealism;  and  that  in 
France,  as  everywhere,  there  had  been  a 
materializing  of  the  spiritual  life,  a  de- 
cline in  the  force  of  ideals.  The  French 
answer  to  this,  repeated  many  times  in 
my  hearing,  and  formally  expressed  by 

1  A  chapter  in  Mr.  Bodley's  book,  "Cardinal  Manning 
and  Other  Essays." 

45 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

different  writers  (among  them  M.  G.  R. 
Levy,  in  the  Revue  Bleu)  is  always  the 
same,  as  to  the  main  point.  The  writers 
point  out— as  foreign  observers,  includ- 
ing myself,  have  done— that  things  have 
changed  in  the  last  decade.  We  have  wit- 
nessed the  commencement  and  positive 
growth  of  a  new  and  fruitful  idealism  in 
France.  It  appears  in  practical  life,  in 
legislation,  in  public  taste,  in  literature, 
philosophy,  and  religion.  Practical  signs 
of  it  are  to  be  seen  in  the  growth  of 
stricter  sentiments  of  personal  and 
social  morality,  of  temperance,  of  the 
limits  of  individual  liberty,  of  the 
requirements  of  social  solidarity  and 
collective  responsibility.  The  wide- 
spread discussion,  focused  in  the 
Institute  of  France,  of  the  alarming 
fall  in  the  French  birth  rate,  has 
shown  this  new  spirit  of  public  concern 
and  awakened  conscience.    The  same  may 

46 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

be  said  in  respect  to  the  question  of  alco- 
holism. The  abolition  of  absinthe  is 
probably  only  the  beginning  of  construc- 
tive temperance  legislation.  As  to  other 
legislation,  a  large  body  of  measures  of 
direct  practical  imi3ort  has  been  before 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  and  many  of  the 
most  important  have  been  enacted,  those 
on  gambling  and  illegitimacy  being  of 
great  importance  as  signs  of  the  move- 
ment of  opinion.  Many  other  things  to 
which  the  extreme  laissez  faire  theory  of 
liberty,  on  the  one  hand,  and  equally  ex- 
treme anti-clericalism,  on  the  other  hand, 
had  given  the  respectability  of  popular 
tradition,  are  now  frankly  criticized  and 
condemned,  among  them,  the  extreme 
license  formerly  accorded  to  theatrical 
performances. 

In  philosophy  this  new  idealistic  move- 
ment is  taking  the  form,  on  the  negative 
side,  of  a  revolt  from  the  positivism  and 
47 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

naturalism  of  the  late  nineteentli  century, 
and  on  the  positive  side,  of  a  new  intui- 
tionism  allied  with  spiritual  mysticism. 
This  latter,  the  spiritual,  assumes  positive 
religious  form,  filling  the  churches  with 
worshipers,  if  not  with  converts,  and 
modifying  the  public  attitude  in  such  im- 
portant matters  as  laical  education  and 
the  treatment  of  religious  organizations. 
The  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  press 
toward  the  church  in  the  last  decade  has 
been  most  noteworthy.  An  analogous 
change  in  public  taste  and  in  those  pur- 
veyors to  it,  the  writers  of  popular  liter- 
ature, shows  itself  in  a  note  of  imoral 
severity  and  literary  austerity.  Since  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities,  articles  have  ap- 
peared in  England  and  the  United  States 
suggesting  that  the  war  itself  had  served 
to  produce  in  France  a  new  devotion,  a 
more  united  national  purpose,  a  higher 
synthesis  of  spiritual  values,  a  rebirth  of 

48 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

the  historical  ideals  of  this  great  people; 
and  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  fact 
of  such  a  change  has  been  made  plain  by 
the  war.  What  an  exhibition  of  unitv, 
restraint,  persistence,  chivalry,  truthful- 
ness, added  to  the  ordinary  military 
virtues  of  loyalty,  bravery,  heroism !  And 
on  what  a  background— the  usual  canvas 
of  war,  painted  over  with  figures  which 
disgrace  even  the  military  life— brutality, 
license,  hate,  deceit,  piracy !  How  unspec- 
tacular, too,  the  French  campaign  has 
been.  No  blowing  of  bugles,  waving  of 
banners,  or  boasting  of  victories!  And 
these  are  the  people  who,  above  all  others, 
love  the  dramatic! 

But  although  the  war  came  at  a  good 
time  to  emphasize  and  crystallize  these 
motives,  it  did  not  produce  them.  The 
future  student  of  national  culture  will  find 
abundant  evidence  to  show  that  the  finest 
preparation  for  the  war,  the  most  con- 
49 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

vincing  assurance  of  victory,  lay  not  in 
the  military  equipment  and  armaments, 
not  in  the  law  of  three  years,  not  in  the 
high  financial  credit  of  France,  but  in 
the  moral  purpose  of  the  people,  in  their 
new  view  of  life  and  duty.  It  lay  in  the 
national  aspiration  for  a  place  in  the 
brighter  sun  of  world  influence  in  litera- 
ture, art,  and  morals,  which  was  gather- 
ing force  and  already  seeking  instruments 
of  expression  when  the  explosion  of  war 
startled  it  into  self-consciousness.  In  a 
series  of  eloquent  papers  written  before 
the  war,  M.  Gabriel  Hanotaux,  formerly 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  himself  one 
of  the  founders  of  French  colonial  policy, 
pointed  out  that  in  view  of  the  apparent 
growth  of  German  commercial  interests 
in  the  Orient,  it  was  France's  true  mis- 
sion to  reassert  in  Eastern  countries  her 
ancient  conquests  in  the  higher  things  of 
the  mind. 

50 


Ill 


Ill 


So  much  for  the  psychological  and 
moral  side  of  our  topic.  Let  us  now  look 
very  briefly  at  the  political  side:  the 
existence  and  role  of  the  triple  entente. 

This  is  not  a  political  paper ;  a  political 
discussion  in  detail  would  require  minute 
quotations  from  state  papers  and  diplo- 
matic utterances.  I  wish  merely  to  point 
out  that  the  existence  of  the  triple  en- 
tente had  both  its  motive  and  its  justifi- 
cation, so  far  as  France  was  concerned, 
in  the  state  of  French  opinion  and  feeling 
which  I  have  described  above. 

The  theory  of  the  ^^ balance  of  power" 
in  Europe  is  expounded  in  many  treatises 
on  European  politics.  As  long  as  one 
53 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

nation  or  combination  of  nations  seems 
bent  on  aggression  or  territorial  expan- 
sion, it  is  necessary  that  its  power  should 
be  balanced  by  that  of  another  combina- 
tion of  equal  military  strength.  This  was 
the  raison  d'etre  of  the  Franco-Russian 
alliance  as  negotiated  by  M.  Delcasse. 
France  was  compelled  to  be  ready  to  meet 
the  German  menace,  which  carried  in  it 
all  the  power  of  the  triple  alliance  of 
Germany,  Austria,  and  Italy.  It  is  gen- 
erally believed  that  it  was  due  to  the  acute 
diplomatic  insight  of  King  Edward,  that 
England  entered  potentially  into  this  co- 
alition with  France  and  Russia.  It  is 
admitted  with  practically  no  dissenting 
voice  among  international  jurists,  that 
the  preservation  of  the  European  peace 
until  now  has  been  due  to  the  creation  of 
the  balance  between  these  two  groups 
of  allied  powers.  The  utility  of  such  a 
balance  then  is  evident ;  nothing  could  re- 
54 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

place  it,  so  long  as  any  one  nation  or 
coalition  maintained  armaments  wliich 
threatened  the  security  or  existence  of 
others.  The  only  possible  alternatives 
were  disarmament,  in  whole  or  part,  by 
common  consent,  or  the  establishment 
of  some  court  of  adjudication  of  inter- 
national disputes  to  take  the  place  of 
war. 

In  respect  to  both  these  directions— 
proposals  for  disarmament  and  sugges- 
tions looking  to  the  judicial  settlement  of 
disputes  by  the  development  of  the  Hague 
Tribunal  into  a  true  international  court 
of  justice— France  has  positively  shown 
her  pacific  intentions  again  and  again. 
While  taking  a  somewhat  secondary  place, 
on  account  of  her  alliance  with  Russia 
France  has  almost  uniformly  supported 
the  suggestions  made  by  England  and  the 
United  States,  while  in  both  alternative 
directions  mentioned,  Germany  has  con- 
55 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

sistently  and  always  found  means  to  hin- 
der progress  or  to  block  the  way  com- 
pletely/ One  of  the  late  cases  of  this, 
outside  the  sphere  of  the  Hague  Tribunal, 
was  the  rejection  of  the  proposal  of  the 
British  Admiralty  for  a  '^ naval  holiday" 
—the  cessation  for  a  time  of  the  building 
of  battleships  by  the  two  countries.^  On 
certain  occasions,  when  pacific  sugges- 
tions failed  of  success,  the  utterances  of 
German  official  personages  have  been  of 
the  most  brutal  frankness,  extolling  the 
sword  as  the  arbiter  of  international  dif- 
ferences, and  war  as  the  most  effective 
means  of  argument.  The  Kaiser's  ^^ rat- 
tling of  the  sword,"  while  the  subject  of 

^  According  to  Mr.  Andrew  Carnegie,  France  had  six 
cases  before  the  Hague  tribunal,  more  than  any  other 
nation.  The  figures  given  by  Mr.  Carnegie  are:  France 
6,  England  5,  the  United  States  3,  Germany  3. 

2  See  the  admirable  brochure,  "How  Britain  Strove 
for  Peace,  A  Record  of  Anglo-German  Negotiations, 
1898-1914,"  by  Sir  Edward  Cook   (Macmillan,  1914). 

56 


I 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

humorous  sarcasm  across  the  ocean,  has 
been  serious  enough  on  the  continent, 
since  it  represented  the  colossal  military 
machine  now  being  used  for  the  ends  for 
which  it  was  constructed.  In  France,  on 
the  contrary,  there  has  been  no  war  party, 
no  pan-Franc  campaign  corresponding  to 
that  of  the  pan-Germanists,  no  military 
bureaucracy,  serving,  the  diffusion  of 
Jingoism ;  but  a  steady  movement,  led  by 
men  of  the  character  of  Baron  d'Estour- 
nelle  de  Constant,  in  the  direction  of  the 
establishment  of  international  judicial 
institutions.  The  admirable  efforts  of  Mr. 
Taf t,  while  president,  to  negotiate  treaties 
covering  all  possible  subjects  of  dispute, 
were  seconded  by  England  and  France 
but  rejected  by  Germany.  It  was  reported 
that  Germany  gave  a  reluctant  consent 
after  the  other  treaties  were  prepared,  but 
as  a  fact  no  treaty  with  Germany  was 
presented  to  the  American  Senate.    Even 

57 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

with  the  United  States,  Germany  was  un- 
willing to  forego  the  future  right  to  resort 
to  the  sword.^ 

All  these  external  political  signs  pointed 
in  the  same  direction.  They  gave  formid- 
able body  to  the  French  fear  of  German 
aggression.  They  justified  fully  both  the 
military  preparation  and  the  formation 
of  the  triple  entente,  considered  as  the 
means  of  preventing  or  checking  such 
aggression.  When  the  moment  arrived 
and  the  pretext  arose,  it  became  evident 
that  the  voice  of  diplomacy,  the  cry  of 
alarm  of  all  Europe  in  the  interests  of 
millions  of  people,  and  the  trumpet  call 
of  national  honor,  were  together  not  to 

^  The  suggestion  made  by  the  present  writer,  in  an 
address  before  an  American  organization  in  Paris,  of  an 
"All-Atlantic  Alliance,"  a  moral  affirmation  by  England, 
France,  and  the  United  States  in  the  sense  of  Mr.  Taft's 
treaties,  was  well  received.  The  treatises,  as  presented 
to  the  Senate,  only  to  meet  defeat,  practically  amounted 
.to  such  an  affirmation. 

58 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

be  sufficient  to  stay  the  fearful  thing;  it 
was  to  be,  after  all,  the  appeal  to  arms  for 
which  the  nation  trained  in  military 
science  had  always  declared  its  preference. 
To  France  the  menace  turned  in  a  day 
into  the  onrushing  monster,  and  the  triple 
entente  show^ed  itself  the  adequate  defense 
provided  by  a  wise  and  prudent  foresight. 
For  the  attack  took  just  the  form  that 
all  the  world  had  anticipated,  a  crushing 
blow  at  France.  The  first  object  of  the 
war— the  means  to  the  ultimate  end,  if 
not  that  end  itself —was  the  destruction 
of  France,  a  means  which  doubled  itself 
when  this  object  required,  as  further 
means,  the  violation  of  Belgium. 

Was  ever  a  people  better  justified  in 
the  maintenance  of  an  army  and  navy,  in 
the  deliberate  adoption  of  the  machinery 
of  a  military  state,  than  twentieth  century 
France  ?  What  else  could  have  prevailed 
against  the  German  sword  ?  It  is  written  ; 
59 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

**He  that  taketh  the  sword  shall  perish 
by  the  sword." 

It  is  now  plain,  I  think,  that  the  Ger- 
man menace,  taking  on  acute  form  in 
1905,  has  meant  to  the  French  the  immi- 
nent danger  of  war.  Not  desire  for  re- 
venge, not  military  ambition,  has  finally 
led  them  into  it,  but  the  necessity  of  na- 
tional defense,  combined  with  a  duty  to  the 
public  right  of  Europe.  To  England,  the 
latter,  the  duty  was  urgent  only  when 
the  moment  came;  to  France,  both  the 
duty  and  the  necessity  were  immediate. 

The  attitude  of  the  French  people  in 
this  war  is  well  summarized,  in  my 
opinion,  in  the  following  words  spoken  by 
a  man  now  high  in  the  counsels  of  State : 
*^The  war,  to  all  good  Frenchmen,  a  ne- 
cessity to  face,  a  duty  to  fulfill— but  with 
what  heaviness  of  heart  (dans  le  coeur  du 
vrai  frangais,  quelle  lourde  tristesse)  I" 

60 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

M.  Viviani,  the  Premier,  closes  his  patri- 
otic New  Tear's  address  to  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies  with  these  words :' 

"If  this  contest  is  the  most  gigantic  ever  recorded 
in  history,  it  is  not  because  the  people  are  hurling  them- 
selves into  warfare  to  conquer  territory,  to  win  enlarge- 
ment of  material  life,  and  economic  and  political  ad- 
vantages, but  because  they  are  struggling  to  determine 
the  fate  of  the  world.  Nothing  greater  has  ever 
appeared  before  the  vision  of  man.  That  is  the  stake. 
It  is  greater  than  our  lives.  Let  us  continue  then  to 
have  but  one  united  spirit,  and  tomorrow,  in  the  peace 
of  victory,  we  will  recall  with  pride  these  days  of 
tragedy,  for  they  will  have  made  us  more  valorous  and 
better  men," 

As  to  the  future,  no  one  can  prophesy ; 
we  must  await  the  course  of  events.  A 
recent  book,  full  of  fine  analysis  and  able 
criticism,  ^^ France  Herself  Again,'' ^  by 

^Journal  Officiel,  Dec.  23,  1914. 

2  In  this  book,  issued  too  late  to  be  utilized  in  my 
paper,  I  find  conclusions  strikingly  similar  to  those 
expressed  here.  I  commend  the  book  to  English  and 
American  readers.  (New  York  and  London,  Putnam.) 
A  remarkable  lecture,  analyzing  the  practical  and  moral 

61 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

M.  Ernest  Dimnet,  gives  reasons  for 
thinking  that  the  factors  of  reform  and 
vigor  will  dominate  those  of  political  dis- 
ruption which,  in  his  opinion,  are  the 
cause  of  most  of  the  social  complaints  of 
the  past.  I  believe  his  optimism  is  fully 
justified,  the  more  because  there  are  rea- 
sons for  thinking  that  his  indictment  of 
the  democratic  regime,  apart  from  the 
character  of  some  of  its  politicians,  is 
somewhat  severe.  M.  Henri  Bergson, 
commenting  upon  the  recent  excellent 
book  of  M.  Charles  Heyraud,  ^^La  France 
de  demain,"  pronounces  this  eloquent  ver- 
dict :  ^  ^  The  difficulties  which  our  theories 
labored  so  painfully  to  resolve,  have  been 
overcome  by  action— the  action  in  which 
France  is  just  now  engaged.  The  diseases 
which  we  ourselves  discovered,  and  for 

effects  of  the  war,  has  been  published  by  M.  E.  Bou- 
trou,  entitled  "La  Guerre  et  la  Vie  de  demain,"  Revue 
Bleu,  16-23,  Jan.  1915. 

62 


FRANCE  AND  THE  WAR 

which  each  of  us  proposed  a  remedy,  have 
not  lasted  to  be  cured ;  they  have  been  sup- 
pressed by  the  sheer  uplift  of  our  vitality. 
Internal  dissensions,  depopulation,  alco- 
holism, what  will  remain  of  all  this  tomor- 
row if  our  elan  be  maintained?  From 
now  on  France  will  be  able  to  say,  with 
one  of  her  own  great  poets : 

*Le  mal  dont  j'ai  souffert  s'est  enfui  comme  un  reve/  "  ^ 


^  From  M.  Bergson's  "President's  Address,"  Decem- 
ber 12,  1914,  before  the  Academie  des  Sciences  morales 
et  politiques. 

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